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No one starts a war--or rather no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose, the later its operational objective. 1 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War
War is, above all, a political choice. It is distinguishable from mere violence for violence sake by its close association with the struggle of opposing political wills and the decisions made by political leaders to enter and terminate conflict. Political leaders, whether democratically elected or set in place by birthright, committee, coup, or charisma are responsible for making the decision to wage war and for what purpose or objective the war will be fought for. They are also responsible for terminating the war once that objective has been achieved, or when the war's objective is no longer tenable.
Once the decision has been made to fight a war, subsequent decisions on how the war will be fought and the desired end state at termination must be considered. This is the classical ends, ways, and means balancing necessary to ensure success in waging war. The end state gives rise to the objectives sought for the conflict, which must, in turn, be balanced with the means available to wage the war. The way in which the means will be employed to achieve the objectives constitutes the strategy to be employed by the belligerent to achieve their end state.
Strategy is defined in Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, as "the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational objectives."
2 This paper will focus on the American military instrument of power employed in a strategy of limited war as an alternative to the strategy of total war.
Limited war has been defined as war "in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement."
3
Limited war is about influence and persuasion through the use of military force, and denotes a strategy aimed at affecting an adversary's will, rather than crushing that will or destroying his military capabilities. The desired effect is to create the conditions where continued resistance is determined to be less attractive than granting the desired concessions to one's opponent.
Limited war is sharply contrasted with total war, which has been defined as a "distinct twentieth-century species of unlimited war in which all the human and material resources of the belligerents are mobilized and employed against the total national life of the enemy." 4 Total war is fought for unlimited objectives that ultimately threaten the survival of the state itself or a regime in power. The totality of these objectives severely constrains the effective political control of the intensity, scope, and destructiveness of the conflict. The only limiting factor in total war is defined by the finite capacities in men, material, and technologies possessed by the belligerents to destroy their enemy's ability to resist. Ibid., 2-4. removal of the ruling regime and the complete destruction of the adversary's military capability to resist. These total war objectives clearly defined the termination of the conflict with the unconditional surrender of the enemy. There were no capitulation ceremonies for either Afghanistan or Iraq, and both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) continue as ongoing conflicts requiring the commitment of U.S. military forces and large financial expenditures for the United States. Both conflicts were initially conducted with limited U.S. military forces in an effort to limit the means employed in toppling the established governments, but these forces were not necessarily well suited for limited war.
This trend of waging war for unlimited objectives using limited forces and means has created an imbalance in the application of U.S. military power. This imbalance, in the application of military force, is due largely to a misconception of the limitation of war by the limiting of means, both the size of forces engaged and the firepower employed, versus the bounding of a conflict by the limitation of the objectives sought by the belligerents. There are three models to categorize limited wars, which include the scale of means, the geographic span of the conflict, and the scope of the objectives sought for the war. 6 The third model, scope of objectives, is the only one that clearly delineates total wars from limited wars.
Distinguishing wars based on the scale of the resources applied to waging the conflict, specifically the quantity, quality, and type of forces, weapons, and material employed is inadequate for the purposes of characterizing a war as limited. This model concentrates solely on the means employed, rather than all means available to the belligerents to wage the war. Focusing on the scale of means must also consider the destructive capability of the weapons used. 7 This focus was instrumental in the development of the U.S. strategy of limited war during the Cold War period, as both superpowers attempted to reduce the potential for escalation to total nuclear 6 Ibid.
7
Ibid., 4.
war. 8 The view that the magnitude or destructiveness of weapons distinguishes limited or total wars is undermined by the possibility of waging total war with rudimentary weapons.
9
Characterizing wars, as limited by the geographic span of the conflict, is also unconstructive. With this view, total war is distinguished from limited war by the extent of territory or the number of states involved in the conflict. With geographic span as the differentiator, a limited war would involve local conflicts, to include internal or civil wars, and conflict between bordering states, with total war encompassing an entire continent, region, or larger theater of war. The geographic span serves more to determine the potential means available to fight the war than it does to determine a war's strategy. Classifying wars as limited based on their geographic territory runs contrary to the idea that war cannot be limited at the local level.
For those directly involved with the physical fighting of a war, there can be no such thing as limited war.
10
The scope of the political objectives, whether limited or unlimited in their nature, is essential in distinguishing between total and limited war. Under the scope model, wars are total if their objectives are total in their nature, requiring either the complete destruction of the enemy or their unconditional surrender, and they are limited if they are deliberately fought for limited objectives short of the adversary's complete defeat and subjugation. 11 The scope of objectives is a determinate element for both the scale of means and the geographic span of a war. If the objectives for a conflict are limited in nature, the means employed to wage the war will also be limited. The limitation of the objectives sought in a conflict limits the scale and the span of a conflict, and preservers the political nature of the war itself. The concepts of limited war theory and strategy continue to have relevance in the application of U.S. military power in the 21st Century. This relevance is predicated on an understanding of the requirement to limit the desired political objectives and to ensure that a military capability to achieve those limited objectives exists. The implementation of limited war strategies will require a fundamental change in the expectations of the American populace with regards to the utility of U.S. military power, and a cultural transformation within the American military itself. There are additional implications for the international community if the U.S.
chooses to wage limited wars in response to current and emerging threats. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, briefly discusses "Limited Interventions" as part of full spectrum operations, but emphasizes the operational and tactical mission sets rather than the theory or a strategy of limited war. 13 The intent for this paper is to resurrect, or re-introduce, the theory of limited war into discussions concerning U.S. security policy and military planning at the political and strategic levels. This is necessary to provide both political and military leaders with alternatives to the current trend in American conflicts being fought as total wars. Limited war strategies are not to be seen as "the way," but rather "a way" of confronting the challenges of 12 Ibid., 1-2.
13 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-7. modern conflict. Additionally, the potential for limited wars to be fought amongst other nations makes it all the more important for limited war concepts to be appreciated prior to the U.S. becoming directly or indirectly involved. This paper examines the theory of limited war and the development of that theory into a strategy of limited war for the United States. The ideas and concepts of five leading limited war theorists show a progression from Carl von Clausewitz's natural moderation of war into an articulated theory of limited war, and the expansion of that theory into a strategy of limited war.
William V. O'Brien's guidelines for limited war written during the Cold War period will be used to scrutinize the American use of limited war strategy since the articulation of that strategy, and to identify common themes of success and failure in implementing those guidelines.
14 The Sino- 
Limited War Theory
No American can fail to be interested in knowing the nature and characteristics of these limited wars, given that they dominate the periods of peace that we long for, and the war that we hope to avoid. between his theoretical extreme of "absolute" war, and its true form of war, "real war" by introducing modifying or moderating tendencies in war. These modifying factors included the ideas that war is never an isolated act, but rather influenced by political forces, that war is not 16 Clausewitz, [80] [81] Ibid., 610.
18 Ibid., 579-581.
settled by a single short blow, but rather a series of successive acts, or operations, and, finally, the result or outcome of a war is never final.
19
In adjusting his view of the military objective, Clausewitz introduces the potential for limited aims or objectives in war. 20 He explains the gap between the anticipated maximum exertion by the belligerents engaged in the struggle and the actual tendency for them to adopt a middle course as example of their willingness to limit not only their efforts by their military objectives as well. 21 Clausewitz concedes that the "conquest of the whole of the enemy's territory is not always necessary" and that there are circumstances when "a country's total occupation may not be enough" to produce a victory that leads to peace.
22
Clausewitz introduces a theory of limited war and provides the foundational concepts of political primacy, the interaction of contesting wills, and the identification of unlimited and limited war by the objectives or the aims for the war. These concepts were broadened by Sir Julian Corbett in 1911.
Sir Julian Corbett
British maritime strategist and military theorist Sir Julian Corbett advanced the theory of limited war drawing heavily from Clausewitz's work, but he introduced a maritime aspect from the British colonial wars of the 19th Century. Clausewitz's work had been critiqued for lacking this naval perspective. Corbett insisted that maritime theory and strategy could not be separated from the larger theory of war in general. He delineated maritime strategy as a "minor strategy" that served the "major strategy," or grand strategy concerned with the political objectives in war, 
Dr. Robert E. Osgood
The evolution of limited war theory gathered momentum during the post-nuclear era with the concern that war might finally achieve Clausewitz's "absolute" form, given the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons. Political negotiations became key with the advent of nuclear weapons and the resultant Cold War between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.
Following World War II, the U.S. was faced with countering the emerging threat of Soviet expansionism with a reduction in military spending and manpower. This balance required a new strategy that would require fewer military forces to achieve the nation's strategic objectives.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower chose to counter the Soviet threat with nuclear weapons in a policy known as "Massive Retaliation."
27
Beyond the point of nuclear parity between the superpowers and a credible second response capability, the U.S. adopted a policy of massive retaliation, which promised deterrence of the Soviets through the threat of an overmatching nuclear reaction to counter any Soviet Osgood was a leading American academic who advocated a limited war strategy for the United
States in the post-nuclear era.
Osgood provided two basic rules that were fundamental in fighting a successful limited war. The first rule was that the belligerents be prepared to conduct war in accordance with welldefined, limited political objectives, and be willing to accommodate the objectives of their adversary. In this respect, Osgood agrees with the political primacy, but advances the concept of using force to promote negotiations. 30 His second rule is that the belligerents be willing to limit the means employed towards these limited objectives. This point was key given that total war was still possible with limited technological means. Osgood evoked the example of ancient Rome when he relates, "Rome did not need nuclear bombs to annihilate Carthage." 31 He added that the belligerents in any conflict were free to follow or violate these rules as they saw fit. 
33
In the eyes of General Taylor, massive retaliation was a stillborn strategy that had failed in the Korean War, and this failure required the U.S. to reconsider its strategy for the Cold War.
The U.S. had lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons, and the continuing existence of limited wars like Korea exposed a gap between the need for forces capable of fighting limited wars and their existence or availability. In General Taylor's words, nuclear weapons might be "sufficient to deter a Great War, but would not maintain the Little Peace." 34 Any new strategy would have to deter general, or total, war with the Soviets, while deterring or quickly winning limited wars.
32 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979) , 11-14.
33 Taylor, [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] . 34 Taylor, 1-11. 
William V. O'Brien
The His second guideline is the limitation of objectives to be achieved in the use of a limited war strategy. This is to avoid broad, nebulous objectives that could possibly keep the state at war indefinitely. The limiting of objectives is also to prevent the escalation of a limited war into a total war fought for unlimited goals with unlimited means--read as total nuclear war and mutually assured destruction. 
Limited War Guidelines
One mistake that we avoided in Korea was an insistence on "total victory" or "unconditional surrender" before talking peace. But in light of many of the slogans that fill the air and the public prints nowadays, I am moved to wonder if all our citizens have come to understand the concept of limited war. A limited war is not merely a small war that has not yet grown to full size. It is a war in which the objectives are specifically limited in light of our national interest and our current capabilities. The internal struggle between President Truman and his military commander, and MacArthur's subsequent relief, demonstrates the primacy of the political over the military during the Korean War. The war also established the precedent for the civilian control over nuclear weapons rather than military commanders. 48 General MacArthur pushed to escalate the conflict to total war objectives, but President Truman was determined to bound the conflict under the U.N. mandate U.S. and allied forces were acting under. 49 He has been criticized for reducing military pressure prior to armistice negotiations by agreeing to a ceasefire that forced U.S. commanders to halt pressure on the Chinese forces, losing tactical momentum.
50
The political constraints of the Truman Administration, the requirement to defend
Western from Soviet aggression, and the desire to remain within the bounds of the U.N. mandate caused the U.S. to limit its objectives to the defense of and restoration of the sovereignty of South Additionally, the U.S. had an abundance of manpower available through the draft, which remained in effect following the Korean War. This abundance allowed the U.S. to maintain a 60 O'Brien, 257-260. 61 Ibid., 260-261. 62 Ibid.
conventional, manpower heavy mindset towards a conflict fundamentally unconventional in nature. 63 New weapons systems, to include precision guided munitions, also allowed for the employment of greater, more lethal, firepower beneath the threshold of tactical nuclear weapons.
The U.S. fought the Vietnam War with unilaterally self-imposed rules, which proved disadvantageous to its prosecution of the war. There were no formal negotiations with North
Vietnam until the latter half of the conflict, with both belligerents choosing to communicate through escalation of the conflict with increased force or loosened targeting restraints.
Communication beyond kinetic force occurred through public announcements by both sides. The U.S. refusal to invade or directly attack the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi or its key infrastructure also communicated the lack of U.S. will to prosecute the war.
64
As with the Korean War, the U.S. did not fully mobilize the nation for the Vietnam War.
President Johnson did not ask Congress for a formal declaration of war, desiring to maintain a balance between the funding of his "Great Society" domestic agenda and the prosecution of a politically dangerous and domestically unpopular conflict in Vietnam. There is no indication that this lack of economic and industrial mobilization for the war was detrimental to the war's outcome. It did, however, play a significant part in revealing the lack of U.S. will and American popular support to the North Vietnamese.
The U.S. also chose not to employ the psychological instrument of war during the 
A Shift Towards Total Wars--Analysis of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq
The Under O'Brien's guidelines, the U.S. has self-imposed unilateral rules on the conduct of war in Iraq. Any pretension that the adversary will abide by these rules has been disregarded.
There has been a considerable effort to ensure that the conflict does not escalate into a Sunni and Shia'a civil war within Iraq that could draw in neighboring states, spreading the span of the conflict. Additionally, the U.S. has purposefully not employed the psychological instrument of war in either conflict, but has rather made considerable effort to prevent the defining of the Iraqi and Afghani populations, or Muslims as "the enemy."
The United States has not fully mobilized the nation's industrial base, or its manpower base in support of operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. There is a contradiction in the "mobilization" question, given that the U.S. has mobilized its Reserve and National Guard forces to support ongoing operations. This has been largely due to the additional demands placed on unit rotations for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Two key factors have affected the U.S.'s ability to employ a "fight-and-negotiate" method of limited war. Following failed attempts to convince the Taliban to meet U.S. initial demands, negotiations at the strategic and operational levels were set aside with military force directed at the total war objective of defeating the adversary's military capabilities and the removal of the regime. This was driven in large part by the U.S. declaration of unwillingness to negotiate with terrorists and that the U.S. considered state sponsors of terrorism as culpable along with the terrorists they support. Additionally, the pace of operations, and the swift collapse of opposition forces did not allow for a "fight-and-negotiate" tempo. The resultant method was heavily reliant on fight-and-pursue, rather than negotiations to end the conflict. The pace of operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom also prevented third party negotiations prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.
The partial implementation of the elements of limited war strategy in Afghanistan is sharply contrasted with the absence of significant limitation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was initiated under a total war construct for the removal of the Baath Party regime and Saddam Hussein, and continues to be waged towards this end with the reconstruction, development, and democratization of the Iraqi state. The decision to enter the war and its objectives were set by U.S. political leaders, but a conscious effort was made to allow military commanders to execute the campaign to its desired, swift conclusion.
Other Nations and Limited War
Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment,' or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations without immediate military action--so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.
Some the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action. . . . Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved. The punitive incursion into Vietnam was to be a limited one in objectives sought, duration, and intensity.
72 Chinese leadership understood the delicate balance that had to be struck in respect to the timing of the attack and the intensity of the conflict. A window of opportunity for the attack existed that would be open after the spring thaw in the north, which would prevent the Soviets from intervening with their own attack, and prior to the flooding season in Vietnam that might impede the Chinese attack and planned withdrawal. Therefore, the Chinese had to consider two fronts, one offensive against the Vietnamese, and the second a defensive one along the border with Russia.
73
China sought two strategic objectives in their conflict with the Vietnamese. The first was to communicate with the Vietnamese government the sincerity of China's displeasure with the Vietnamese treatment of Chinese along the border, and the second was the objective of bloodying the Vietnamese Army (VNA). The operational objectives for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were the capture several provincial capitals and the threatening of the major approach route leading to Hanoi. The PLA was to halt operations at the southernmost provincial capital of Long San, and then destroy Vietnamese gun emplacements and military complexes as it withdrew back across the border. 74 The limitation of these objectives was driven by both political and practical military concerns. Chinese anti-aircraft defenses could only protect ground forces out to 50 kilometers from the Chinese-Vietnamese border, with Hanoi's air defense system prohibiting any support from the Chinese air force beyond that distance.
75 72 Zhang, 860. 73 Zhang, 855-859. 74 Jencks, 801-804. 75 Ibid., 808-809.
According to Chinese doctrine, the attack was to be made with superior forces that would conduct "quick-decision battles of annihilation" 76 against Vietnamese regular forces, allowing the Chinese to operate in a set piece battle, depleting the VNA's capabilities. Instead of fighting Vietnamese regulars, the Chinese encountered border units supported by irregulars and local militia groups, which were supported by VNA artillery. The restrictive mountain terrain made a conventional thrust with Chinese armored units impractical, and the urban fighting that developed in the provincial capitals proved difficult for the PLA. The Chinese forces were ill-trained for this kind of battle given that most of their duties had been related to agricultural work and border enforcement since the Korean War. The battle hardened Vietnamese forces proved more capable than anticipated by the Chinese.
77
The Chinese did not fully mobilize for the conflict, and the forces that did participate were employed in an economy of force role. Chinese forces were also deployed in the north in anticipation of an attack by Soviet forces. The Chinese did utilize the propaganda machine within
China to promote the psychological instrument for support for a war against an enemy which many Chinese would have normally considered their friendly neighbors. The decision not to mobilize and the difficulty in producing a "war spirit" in the population necessitated a short and decisive victory.
78
The rules of the conflict were established initially by the Chinese legal justification for the war by declaring it a "self-defense counterattack." The Chinese also sought to keep the geographic span of the conflict limited to the border region with the expressed intent to withdraw and not to retain any Vietnamese territory. The rules were further refined by the Chinese decision not to use its air force or its navy in the war. Aircraft were placed on strip alert and the navy was 76 Zhang, 857.
77 Zhang, [865] [866] [867] [868] [869] . 78 Jencks, 810. sent on maneuvers, but neither service saw combat. 79 China sought to avoid direct conflict with the Soviet Union and succeeded, although it did prepare for its potential. The duration of the conflict precluded a "fight-and-negotiate" methodology, and the publicly expressed intention to withdraw after its objectives were met, left little room for pressure to mount on the Vietnamese government. Third party mediation did not occur for the same reasons.
The PLA was able to achieve their operational objectives, at a higher cost than 83 Makovsky, [27] [28] confined to the Lebanese border region, preferably on the Lebanese side of the border. war that their political leadership had committed them to. This lack of preparedness included a lack of adequate training, improper organizational structures, and poor intelligence on their potential adversaries. Despite these setbacks, both the Chinese and the Israelis achieved their strategic objectives, albeit at the higher cost of lives and time than had been anticipated. Both states were able to achieve these political goals with the effects from military force.
Despite the tactical and operational errors made, both of these conflicts hold valuable lessons for the employment of force in the form of strategic raids and punitive incursions to achieve political ends. They go beyond mere air strikes and place direct pressure on the adversary by presenting the loss of non-organic territories, or organic territories without strategic importance. Both conflicts present lessons for the U.S. to learn as it is faced with the need to apply direct pressure to a state without threatening total war ends. 84 Katz. 85 Makovsky, 10-13.
Indian Cold Start Doctrine of Limited War
The groups" (IBGs) that would be supported by the Indian Air Force and naval aviation for fire support. Along with the goal of taking territory to exchange during post conflict negotiations, there is the additional aim of delivering a severe blow to the Pakistani Army, while avoiding damage to civilian population centers.
88
There are international and regional concerns over the Indian implementation of the Cold Start doctrine. The first concern is the potential for escalation of the conflict beyond the original limited objectives. This concern is directly related to the nuclear capabilities of both states, and the potential for misperceptions regarding the actions being taken in a limited war construct. 
Conclusion
As soon as they tell me it (war) is limited, it means that they do not care whether you achieve a result or not, as soon as they tell me, "surgical," I head for the bushes. The choice to wage war with a limited war strategy should be a deliberate decision with an understanding of the theory of limited war, and what must be considered to implement it with success. This paper has provided a description of the evolution of limited war theory and historical examples, which can be used to re-introduce these concepts into the vernacular of contemporary debate. There are themes that have been identified within the theory and throughout the historical case studies. These themes include; that limited war is contextual, 91 Lewis, 383. politically deliberate, objectives dependent, matched to force capabilities, and clearly communicated, in words and deeds, as limited, to both the adversary and the American populace.
The theorists discussed, all agree that limited war is contextual, given that it is an alternative, amongst others, for a strategy in waging war. It is best seen as a way, not the only way, to fight modern conflicts. Limited war is a tool to be used when that specific tool is required, and not to be indiscriminately applied. There remains Corbett's higher, more difficult road of total war, when the circumstances require such a war.
The contextual nature of limited war also pertains to the perception of the belligerents involved in the conflict. The United State's limited objectives for the Vietnam War ran contradictory to the Vietnamese total objectives sought. It is not enough to limit political objectives, but those objectives must be articulated in word and deed to the adversary in order for the conflict to be limited in nature. In addition to understanding the enemy's military capabilities, it is equally important to understand those objectives, which he is seeking for the conflict, and whether his strategy will match with the implementation of limited war strategy and the employment of limited war forces.
However, there are advantages to employing a limited war strategy to achieve political objectives. The primary advantage is that limited war maintains the political primacy of the conflict. The political choice of limited objectives, and the continuous evaluation of those objectives to determine their validity, preserves the political nature of the conflict. Total wars, in contrast, with their objective to completely defeat the adversary, endanger this political control, particularly in a "fight-and-negotiate" system. With total war, politics and diplomacy are chained until these unlimited objectives are reached. Limited war allows policy to retain its power over the military instrument of force.
A strategy for limited war must be matched with force capabilities to wage limited wars.
After the failure to limit objectives, this would be the second biggest, and most common, blunder made in implementing a limited war strategy. The belief that general-purpose forces can fulfill all tasks and missions is the root cause of the miscalculation of force capabilities requirements for this or any other strategy. The U.S. Army's current Transformation initiatives towards smaller, more deployable, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) is a step in the right direction for creating limited war forces, but these BCTs must also contain the capabilities to continually exert pressure during the negotiate period of "fight-and-negotiate." These capabilities include adequate firepower, logistics, and protection capabilities to allow the force to sustain itself during potential operational pauses.
However, these BCTs are currently fully committed to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a strategic reserve does not exist to reconstitute forces that would be necessary to fight another, limited war. There is presently a gap in capabilities that would preclude the U.S. from implementing a limited war strategy if it were necessary to do so. There is also the need for mobility assets currently dedicated to ongoing conflicts. Increasing both air and sea deployment capabilities is necessary to enable limited forces to be employed where they are needed. The force structure that the United States Army is moving towards has the potential to successfully fight limited wars, if these forces are available to deploy for this purpose. An absence of this capability necessitates the U.S. reliance on other forces, to include nuclear forces, which exceed the threshold of many conflicts that could emerge.
Along with organizational and capabilities requirements, change within the U.S. military culture is also required if the U.S. is to succeed in using limited war strategies in the future. The preceding quote by General Powell is indicative of the misinterpretation of limited war by even the most senior levels of the U.S. military. There is a need to refine the U.S. military culture and its training to include the potential for conflicts waged under proper limited war strategies. A fundamental shift in the military's mindset from a strictly total war emphasis to that of one accepting the theory and the guidelines of limited war is also required.
Military officers and political leadership must understand that the defeat or annihilation of an enemy is not necessarily the purpose or objective in every conflict. In the future, the U.S. military may be required to utilize its dominance in communications and its networked forces to halt operations, rather than to coordinate its race towards total objectives. This halt may be necessary to allow for political negotiations to occur, and will necessitate U.S. commanders to assume a defensive posture unwelcome in the current U.S. military culture. Commanders may be required to take ground and wait for the political process to take its course, while still exerting pressure in Julian Corbett's second stage of the limited war operation. It will take some time before this posture and its associated mindset will be accepted as part of full spectrum operations.
Therefore, there is a need to re-introduce the concepts of limited war and "fight-and-negotiate" within U.S. military training and education, to include simulations that require military leaders to fully capitalize on operational pauses created by a political requirement.
Along with changes in the U.S. military culture, change must also occur in the expectations of the American populace concerning limited wars. Americans must gain an understanding of limited war and accept that the nation will not always be fighting for a complete, decisive victory in the conflicts it enters. This maturing process must be aided by political leadership. Political leaders must clearly communicate the limited objectives for a conflict to develop this understanding and to manage the expectations of the American people.
The nation's policy to not negotiate with terrorists and their sponsors must also be critically considered, and not grafted wholesale onto the "more forceful methods of negotiations" with adversaries in limited wars. U.S. political leadership must also consider O'Brien's rule of third party mediation as essential to limited war in the future. Presently, the U.S. has sought to gain legitimacy through the formation of international coalitions and specifically through sanctions and resolutions from the United Nations. These actions are detrimental to the successful execution of limited war strategies which requires that an impartial, third-party to exist in order to facilitate mediation and negotiation between the belligerents. The difficulty of negotiations between the U.S. and the Vietnamese is one example where the absence of this third party prolonged the conflict.
